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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case concerns the denial of an application for a variance from certain

setback requirements for three decks which had been built within the setback area
without first having obtained a variance or a building permit from Appellant Kootenai
County (hereinafter referred to as "the County.")
B.

Concise Statement of Facts
Respondent Jerry Judd (hereinafter referred to as "Judd") constructed three

decks on real property he owns near Wolf Point on Coeur d'Alene Lake prior to
September of 2005 without first having obtained either a variance or building permits
from the County. (A.R. 1 at 43-50, 181.) The main deck was originally twenty feet by
twenty feet (20' x 20'), and was built into the hillside with pilings located below the high
water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene (elevation 2128' Avista datum, per the decision of
this Court in In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006)). (A.R. at 43-45,
181.) Judd later reduced its size to twenty feet by fifteen feet (20' x 15'). (Board Tr. p.
21 L. 20-24.) The second deck is twelve feet by twelve feet (12' x 12'), is built into the
hillside approximately eleven feet (11 ') from the main deck, and is above the high water

1

References to the agency record prepared by the County in this matter (Case No. V-842-05) for the
Petition for Judicial Review in the District Court will use the abbreviation "A.R." (See R. at 155.)
References to the clerk's record prepared for this appeal will use the standard abbreviation "R."
References to the transcript of the hearings held before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner and the
Board of Commissioners will use the abbreviation "Board Tr." (See id.) This is the transcript originally
prepared for the District Court proceeding, which was filed on September 7, 2006. References to the
transcript of the hearings held before the District Court will use the abbreviation "Dist. Ct. Tr."
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mark. (A.R. at 43-45, 181.) The third deck is twelve feet by eight feet (12' x 8') and is
approximately eleven feet (11 ') above the high water mark. (Id.)
The site is a 1.309-acre parcel which is accessible by boat only. (A.R. at 43-49,
138, 181.) This parcel consists mostly of a steep north-facing slope which is sparsely
vegetated with trees and brush. The shoreline of the parcel consists mostly of rock with
some brush and moss.

(Id.)

The site is located within the County's Restricted

Residential zone. (A.R. at 116, 181.)
The United States Army Corps of Engineers issued a Notice of Violation on or
about June 16, 2005, citing Judd for discharging fill material into Lake Coeur d'Alene
without a permit pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act. (A.R. at 148-51.) The
Kootenai County Building and Planning Department also cited Judd with a code
violation and initiated a code enforcement action (Case No. CV-4079-05). (A.R. at 182.)
The Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) also issued a stop-work order in June of 2005.
(A.R. at 140).
On November 25, 2005, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers sent a letter to Judd
stating that it had determined that the broken rock and the concrete footings which were
the subject of the Notice of Violation were not causing substantial environmental harm,
and that Judd would be eligible to apply for an after-the-fact permit if the necessary
permits were issued by Kootenai County and IDL. (A.R. at 143-44.) IDL also issued a
letter to Judd stating that the portion of the main deck structure located below the high
water mark was in compliance with IDL requirements. (A.R. at 140.)

2

C.

Course of Proceedings
Judd applied to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter

referred to as "the Board") on September 16, 2005 for two variances. (A.R. at 43-50.)
He requested a twenty-five foot (25') variance from the twenty-five foot (25') front
setback requirement outlined in Section 8.09 of the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance
then in effect, Ordinance No. 348, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Zoning
Ordinance"). (A.R. at 46, 49-50, 181.) This requested variance would have allowed for
a front setback of zero (0) feet at the front/north property line for the three existing
decks. (Id.) Judd also requested a variance of seven feet (7') from the ten foot (1 O')
side setback requirement outlined in section 8.09 of the Zoning Ordinance, which would
have allowed a setback of three feet (3') for the deck designated as the "main deck."
(A.R. at 47, 181.)

The application was deemed accepted by the Kootenai County

Building and Planning Department as of October 21, 2005. (A.R. at 117 .)
Judd's variance request was assigned Case No. V-842-05, and was heard by
Kootenai County hearing examiner Gary Young on March 16, 2006. (A.R. at 175-76;
Board Tr. p. 2-11.)

On March 21, 2006, Young issued a recommendation that this

request be denied. (A.R. at 165-69.) Judd requested a public hearing before the Board
in a letter dated March 27, 2006, and the Board granted this request on March 30, 2006.
(A.R. at 25-26, 200; Board Tr. p. 15 L. 2 through p. 16 L. 2.)
On June 1, 2006, the Board held a public hearing on Judd's application and on
similar variance applications submitted by Ted and Johanna Baycroft, and James and

3

Penny Wohrle, who are the owners of two neighboring properties.

2

(AR. at 196-97;

Board Tr. p. 18-36.) Debbie Wilson, then an employee of the Kootenai County Building
and Planning Department, introduced the case. (AR. at 196-97; Board Tr. p. 20 L. 925.)

Judd gave a presentation and responded to questions from the Board, and

comment sheets were received. (AR. at 196-97; Board Tr. p. 21 L. 3 through p. 27 L.
6.) The Board then closed the public hearing in this case and moved on to one of the
other public hearings. (AR. at 197; Board Tr. p. 27 L. 17 through p. 28 L. 1.)
During the course of proceedings on all three cases, Wilson provided the Board
with a document from the Kootenai County Assessor's Office regarding the valuation of
the property. (Board Tr. p. 30 L. 15 through p. 31 L. 12.) After some discussion, the
Board reopened the public hearing in this case in order to admit this document into
evidence and to afford Judd an opportunity to examine it and offer a response. (AR. at
197; Board Tr. p. 31 L. 13 through p. 32 L. 25.) Judd did offer comments in response to
this information. (AR. at 197; Board Tr. p. 33 L. 1 through p. 34 L. 21.) The Board then
closed the public hearing on the Judd application, and deliberated on all three variance
applications shortly afterward. (AR. at 197; Board Tr. p. 34 L. 23 through p. 36 L. 5.)
At the conclusion of that public hearing, the Board voted to deny Judd's variance
request. (AR. at 197; Board Tr. p. 36 L. 6-24.) On June 15, 2006, the Board voted to

2

A transcript of the hearing on the variance requests submitted by Judd, the Wohrles and the Baycrofts,
which were heard simultaneously before the Board, was also filed with the District Court and is part of the
record before this Court in this appeal and in the Wohrle appeal (Docket No. 34095).
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approve the signing of the order denying Judd's variance request, and signed that
order. (AR. at 193-94; Board Tr. p. 39 L. 15 through p. 40 L. 5.)
On July 13, 2006, Judd timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review and Writ of
Mandate in the District Court, which was assigned to the Honorable John T. Mitchell.
(R. at 1-6.) Judd filed a Motion to Augment Record on October 12, 2006. (R. at 59-60.)
The motion was accompanied by an affidavit with exhibits consisting of records from a
variance application submitted by Stephen and Mary lacaboni, which the Board
approved on June 22, 2006. (R. at 9-40.) At a hearing held on November 29, 2006,
the District Court granted the motion, though it questioned the relevance of the
materials. (R. at 84-85; Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 15 L. 5 through p. 16 L. 11.) A written Order
Granting Motion to Augment Record was entered on December 5, 2006. (R. at 84-85.)
The District Court heard oral argument on the Petition for Judicial Review on
February 20, 2007. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 17-55.) After hearing argument from counsel, the
Court made findings and ruled on the matter from the bench. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 49 L. 5
through p. 51 L. 25.) A written Order on Petition for Judicial Review was entered on
February 26, 2007.

(R. at 110-11.) Pursuant to the Court's instructions, the parties

subsequently filed briefing regarding costs and attorney fees. (R. at 112-39; Dist. Ct. Tr.
p. 52 L. 2 through p. 54 L. 14.) The Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting Attorney Fees in this case and in its companion case, Wohr/e v. Kootenai
County, Kootenai County Civil Case No. CV-06-5323, on March 27, 2007. (R. at 140-

49.) The County filed a Notice of Appeal on April 6, 2007. (R. at 150-54.)

5

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court erred in ordering that the record be augmented

to include information pertaining to a variance request which was not at issue in the
petition for judicial review before it.
2.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that the decision of the

Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in Case No. V-842-05 was arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
3.

Whether the District Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the

4.

Whether the District Court erred in ordering that the requested variance be

Board.

granted, subject only to a determination by the Board on remand as to the extent of the
variance to be granted.
5.

Whether the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Judd on the

basis that the decision of the Board was without a basis in fact or law.
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a decision of a local governing board pursuant to the
Local Land Use Planning Act, Title 67, Chapter 65, Idaho Code (LLUPA), on appeal
from a decision of the District Court on a petition for judicial review of the local entity's
decision, has been very recently set forth by this Court as follows:
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to
seek judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as
provided for in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, the Idaho Administrative

6

Procedure Act (IDAPA). For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA
decisions, a local agency making land use decisions, such as the Board,
is treated as a government agency under IDAPA.
In an appeal from district court, where the court was acting in its appellate
capacity under IDAPA, the Supreme Court reviews the agency record
independently of the district court's decision. As to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact, this Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the zoning agency. The Court defers to the agency's findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous and the agency's factual
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even when there is
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by evidence in the record. Planning and zoning decisions are
entitled to a strong presumption of validity, including the agency's
application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances.
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds
that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in
excess of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the
statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d)
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e)
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The party attacking the
agency's action must first illustrate that it erred in the manner specified
therein and must then show that a substantial right of the party has been
prejudiced. Id.

Neighbors fora Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County,_ Idaho_, 176 P.3d 126, 2007
WL 4531786, at *2-*3 (2007) (citations omitted).
IV. ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court erred in ordering that the record be augmented to
include information pertaining to a variance request which was not at issue
in the petition for judicial review before it.

Rule 84(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs the District Court's
ability to approve or deny a request for augmentation of the record before it on a petition
for judicial review. It reads as follows:
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Any party desiring to augment the transcript or record with additional
materials presented to the agency may move the district court within
twenty-one (21) days of the filing of the settled trc1nscript and record in the
same manner and pursuant to the same procedure for augmentation of
the record in appeals to the Supreme Court. Where statute provides for
the district court itself to take additional evidence, the party desiring to
present additional evidence must move the court to do so within twentyone (21) days of the filing of the transcript and record with the district
court. Where statute provides for the district court to remand the matter
for the agency to take further evidence before the district court renders its
decisions on judicial review, the district court may remand the matter to
the agency.
1.R.C.P. 84(l).
The decision to grant or deny a motion for augmentation of the record on appeal
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Crown Point Development, Inc. v.
City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 75-76, 156 P.3d 573, 576-77 (2007).

A decision

within the discretion of the district court will not be disturbed on appeal if the court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason.· Id. at 76, 156 P.3d at
577.
With respect to decisions made under LLUPA, the appropriate legal standard is
found in Idaho Code § 67-5276, which determines whether the district court may take
additional evidence itself, or whether a remand to the appropriate entity is necessary. It
reads as follows:
( 1) If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for
leave to present additional evidence and it is shown to the satisfaction of
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the court that the additional evidence is material, relates to the validity of
the agency action, and that:
(a) there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding
before the agency, the court may remand the matter to the agency with
directions that the agency receive additional evidence and conduct
additional factfinding.
(b) there were alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency,
the court may take proof on the matter.
(2) The agency may modify its action by reason of the additional evidence
and shall file any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the
reviewing court.
Idaho Code§ 67-5276.
Here, as in Crown Point, the District Court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. However, it failed to act
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal
standards.
First, the District Court erred in finding that the materials proffered by Judd were
material to a review of the decision made by the Board in this case. The issue before
the Board was whether to grant Judd's request for variances from setback requirements
set forth in the Zoning Ordinance.

Idaho Code § 67-6516 states in part that "[a]

variance ... may be granted to an applicant only upon a showing of undue hardship
because of characteristics of the site and that the variance is not in conflict with the
public interest." A variance request focuses upon a specific parcel of property. City of

Burley v. Mccaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,909, 693 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Ct. App.

9

1984). It is, by definition, "limited to adjustment of certain regulations concerning the
physical characteristics of the subject property." Gay v. Bonneville County, 103 Idaho
626, 628, 651 P.2d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 1982).
According to the above-cited authority, the decision of whether to grant or deny a
variance is to be made based on unique characteristics of the parcel for which the
variance is requested where compliance with the land use regulation at issue would
constitute an undue hardship.

Additionally, the Board did not hear the lacaboni

application after it had made its decision on Judd's request. Therefore, this evidence is
not material, nor would it relate to the validity of the Board's action in this case. Even if
this Court were to find that the lacaboni application was material to the Judd request,
that it related to the validity of the Board's action on that request, and that there were
good reasons for failure to present that information at the Board hearing on that request,
the District Court nonetheless erred because it failed to remand the matter to the Board
to conduct additional fact finding after consideration of its decision in the lacaboni
matter. See Idaho Code§ 67-5276(1)(a).
Finally, the District Court erred in granting this motion because the proffered
materials did not constitute evidence of alleged irregularities in procedure before the
Board. Instead, as the District Court recognized, these materials were offered to show
that the Board's decision in this case was arbitrary and capricious. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 15 L.
5 through p. 16 L. 9.) Thus, it was offered in support of Judd's allegation that the Board
committed a substantive error in reaching its decision in this case, rather than a

10

procedural irregularity. Daley v. Blaine County, 108 Idaho 614, 617 n.2, 701 P.2d 234,
237 n.2 (1985); cf. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 360-61, 2 P.3d 738, 745-46
(2000) (finding that district court erred by augmenting record with substantive evidence
outside agency record but holding that error was harmless).
For these reasons, the District Court abused its discretion in granting Judd's
motion to augment the record to include materials pertaining to another case in which
the Board granted a variance.

This alone is reason enough for this Court, at a

minimum, to vacate the decision of the District Court.

B.

The District Court erred in holding that the decision of the Kootenai County
Board of Commissioners in Case No. V-842-05 was arbitrary, capricious,
and an abuse of discretion.
1.

The decision of the Board was not arbitrary and capricious.

The District Court found that the Board's decision in that case was arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of the Board's discretion. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 50 L. 22-25.) For
the reasons stated below, the Court erred in making this determination.
A variance from the requirements of a county land use ordinance is defined in
Idaho Code§ 67-6516. This reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
A variance is a modification of the bulk and placement requirements of the
ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front yard, side yard,
rear yard, setbacks, parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance
provision affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement of the
structure upon lots, or the size of lots. A variance shall not be considered
a right or special privilege, but may be granted to an applicant only upon a
showing of undue hardship because of characteristics of the site and that
the variance is not in conflict with the public interest.
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Idaho Code§ 67-6516 (emphasis added). As stated above, a variance request focuses
upon a specific parcel of property, and is limited to the adjustment of certain regulations
concerning the physical characteristics of that property.

City of Burley, 107 Idaho at

909, 693 P.2d at 1111; Gay, 103 Idaho at 628, 651 P.2d at 562.
The approval or denial of a variance is within the discretion of the body with
authority to make decisions under county land-use planning ordinances, including
boards of county commissioners. Idaho Code§§ 67-6516, 67-6519; Sanders Orchard
v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002). This discretion is not

unbounded, however.

Sanders Orchard, 137 Idaho at 698, 52 P.3d at 843.

For a

variance to be granted, the applicant must show that he or she has suffered an undue
hardship due to the characteristics of the site, and must additionally show that the
variance would not conflict with the public interest. See Idaho Code§ 67-6516.
Applications for variances are also governed under the Zoning Ordinance, the
relevant portions of which are cited in Section 4.01 of the Board's decision in Case No.
V-842-05.

(A.R. at 183.)

In order for a variance application to be approved, the

following findings must be made:
a)

Whether the requirements of Section 30.03 [regarding notice of
public hearing and the holding of that hearing] have been met.

b)

Whether the reasons set forth in the application justify the granting
of a variance.

c)

That the variance is the minimum that will make possible the
reasonable use of the land, building or structure.

12

d)

That the granting of the variance will be in harmony with the
general purpose and intent of the Zoning Ordinance, and will not be
injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the public
welfare.

Zoning Ordinance § 30.03 (subsequently codified at Kootenai County Code § 9-23-3).
There is a strong presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards,
which includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances.
Sanders Orchard, 137 Idaho at 698, 52 P.3d at 843.

The District Court found that the decision of the Board was not supported by
evidence in the record, and thus was arbitrary and capricious. The Court based this
decision on its finding that there was no evidence in the record which supported the
Board's finding that Judd failed to establish that the granting of variances would not be
in conflict with the public interest. (Dist Ct. Tr. p. 49 L. 5 through p. 51 L. 25.) Because
the decision of the Board was supported by substantial, and in fact undisputed,
evidence in the record, the District Court erred in making this determination.
The structures at issue were each built within a twenty-five foot (25') setback
applicable to properties within the Restricted Residential zone without first obtaining the
necessary variances. Zoning Ordinance§ 8.09 (subsequently codified at K.C.C. § 9-810). (See A.R. at 45-50, 116, 181-82.) This is a prerequisite to the issuance of building
permits for construction of structures within a setback. These structures were also built
without the required building permits.

See Zoning Ordinance § 28.02 (subsequently

codified at K.C.C. § 9-22-2); K. C.C. § 7-1-7. It was only after Judd received a Notice of
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Violation from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, however, and after the code
enforcement action which ensued from that violation was initiated, that he came to the
County asking for forgiveness.
Under these circumstances, to grant variances to Judd by the Board under these
circumstances, or worse, to require the Board to grant variances to Judd, as did the
District Court, would be to grant "a right or special privilege" specifically prohibited by
Idaho Code § 67-6516.

Such variances are also clearly in conflict with the public

interest, as the Board specifically found in Sections 5.01 through 5.03 of its order, as
follows:
The issuance of variances that not only encroach into the required setback
but also the lakebed is not in the public interest and would allow a benefit
that is not afforded lo other property owners fronting Coeur d'Alene
Lake ....
The granting of the variance requested in this application does not meet
the requirements of Idaho Code §67-6516 because it would serve to
legitimize [Judd's] construction of decks without required building permits,
which would be considered a special privilege ....
[T]he requested variance is not necessary lo accommodate the
recreational use of the property and would be detrimental to surrounding
properties and the public welfare if zero setbacks and lake encroachments
were to be allowed, even by special permit.
(A.R. at 184.) Furthermore, these findings show, at a minimum, that the granting of
variances in this case would not be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of
the Zoning Ordinance, which must certainly include an expectation of compliance with
its provisions. See Zoning Ordinance§ 30.03 (K.C.C. § 9-23-3).
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In addition, Judd offered no evidence to the Board that his requested variances
were the minimum variances necessary to make possible the reasonable use of the
property, as the District Court recognized.

(Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 51 L. 4-24.)

This is

especially true of the requested "zero setback" (actually a "negative" setback to the
extent the structures cantilever over the lake). The only stated reason for the requested
setback variances was to legalize the structures actually built. Had Judd contacted the
County before building these structures, Judd could have designed a site plan which
provided for no encroachment into the setback (in which case a variance would have
been unnecessary), or at least requested one or more variances for a lesser
encroachment than the structures which were actually built.
Judd's attempt to excuse his conduct as not being in bad faith, and that he was
simply misinformed, does not rise to the level of justifying the granting of variances,
either. Ignorance of the law is no excuse, and neither is reliance on the representation
of persons with no connection to the County. It is the duty of the property owner to
ascertain what regulations may pertain to a contemplated building project before the
owner commences it.
Based on the above discussion and the record as a whole, the decision of the
Board in Case No. V-842-05 was supported by substantial evidence, and was neither
arbitrary nor capricious. Moreover, it was well within the Board's authority, and within
the sound discretion vested in the Board by the statutes and ordinances which grant
that authority, to deny the requested variances for failure to show that they would not
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conflict with the public interest based on the undisputed evidence in the record.
Therefore, the decision of the District Court in this case should be vacated, and the
decision of the Board should be affirmed.

2.

No substantial rights were preiudiced as a result of the Board's decision.

As Justice Stephen Bistline once pointed out, "there is no entitlement to a ...
variance, even where an applicant has met all of the required conditions. The granting
of such a variance is discretionary with the Board of Commissioners, and the fact that
an applicant has jumped through all the right hoops does not necessarily guarantee that
the Board will decide in the applicant's favor."

South Fork Coalition v. Bonneville

County, 117 Idaho 857, 868, 792 P.2d 882, 893 (1990) (Bistline, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
The denial of Judd's variance request does not deprive Judd of any lawful use of
his property prior to his variance application; it merely reinforces the pre-existing
limitations on the use of this property. Moreover, even without the requested variances,
Judd is still able to put his property to use as permitted under applicable state laws and
regulations, and county ordinances.

Specifically, ownership of this property entitles

Judd to use and enjoy a dock on Lake Coeur d'Alene, so long as it is in compliance with
the requirements of the Idaho Department of Lands and, when applicable, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. This is a reasonable use of this property which accrues to
only a relatively few number of parcels located in Kootenai County.
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Because Judd is not entitled to the granting of variances, and because Judd is
able to put the property to reasonable use with or without variances, no substantial
rights have been prejudiced as a result of the decision in this case. Accordingly, that
decision should be affirmed.

C.

The District Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the Board.
Idaho Code § 67-5279 begins by very clearly stating that when a court is

considering a petition for judicial review, "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code §
67-5279(1). Instead, the court must instead defer to the Board's findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous. Sanders Orchard, 137 Idaho at 697-98, 52 P.3d at 842-43.
It is very apparent from the record, however, that the District Court did just that in
determining that the decision of the Board was arbitrary and capricious.

During the

District Court's ruling from the bench, the Court stated the following:
The argument was made today that as far as the public interest
component that I have to decide, quote, people must comply with county
ordinances including zoning and building ordinances, and then later on,
not getting the proper permit is relevant, but it's not determinative as to the
public interest. With all due respect, I disagree with that. I don't think that
is a component. ...
What is at issue is whether it was an undue hardship given the terrain to
seek a variance, and then whether the variance would be in conflict with
the public interest. All the relevant parties have weighed in. Neighbors,
Department of Lands, the Corps. They're just - I don't think there's any
indication in the record, period, that the variance wasn't in conflict with the
public interest.
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(Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 50 L. 4-20.) This shows that the District Court engaged in impermissible
fact finding in rendering its decision in this case.
The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Attorney Fees,
entered on March 27, 2007, made statements which were even more glaring. First, the
Court again engaged in impermissible fact finding by stating that "there was ample
evidence in the record to show that [Judd] had met the two requirements of J.C. § 676516 .... " (R. at 146.)

The Court then went on to state that "the reason the Court

remands this case back to the Board of County Commissioners is to have the
commissioners do what they should have done the first time." (R. at 147; emphasis
added.)
Finally, the Court stated that it had held "that there was a due process violation
when the Board deviated from the record .... " (R. at 148.) This statement is untrue for
two reasons.

First, while the Court did discuss whether a due process violation

occurred, it stopped short of making that specific finding. (See Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 49 L. 1218.) Secondly, the Board could not have deviated from the record, since it reopened
the public hearing to receive additional testimony and evidence regarding information
obtained from the Kootenai County Assessor's Office at the Board's request.

(See

Board Tr. p. 32 L. 7 through p. 35 L. 6.)
The statements of the District Court quoted above show that it erred by
determining the relevance of evidence, weighing evidence, and making factual findings
in making its decision, rather than deferring to the factual findings of the proper finder of
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fact, which in this case is the Board. Therefore, the Court should vacate the decision of
the District Court and affirm the decision of the Board.
D.

The District Court erred in ordering that the requested variances be
granted, subject only to a determination by the Board on remand as to the
extent of the variances to be granted.

In its decision given at the February 20, 2007 hearing, the District Court
remanded the case to the Board for the limited purpose of determining the appropriate
scope of the variances to be granted. As discussed above, the District Court erred in
doing so because this constituted an impermissible substitution of the Court's judgment
for that of the Board. Additionally, it violated the statutory mandate that "[i]f the agency
action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further
proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3).
In Daley v. Blaine County, 108 Idaho 614, 701 P.2d 234 (1985), the district court
reversed a decision denying a request for a conditional use permit and for a setback
variance, finding that the decision of the Blaine County Board of Commissioners was
"arbitrary and capricious and clearly erroneous." Daley, 108 Idaho at 616, 701 P.2d at
236.

The district court's order of judgment ordered Blaine County to grant the

requested conditional use permit and setback variance. Id. This Court reversed that
decision. Id. In doing so, this Court made the following observation:
The district court's review of the board of county commissioners' decision
was pursuant to I.C. § 67-5215. Under I.C. § 67-5215, the district court
was acting only in an appellate capacity. District courts acting in this
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capacity are not authorized to interfere with the substantive
decisionmaking process .... To sanction such interference in the ordinary
case would undermine the important role local agencies play in the land
use planning process and possibly negate meaningful participation by the
public in the decisionmaking process.
Id. at 617-18, 701 P.2d at 237-38 (quotations omitted).

Here, the District Court effectively ordered the Board to grant variances to Judd
when it expressly limited the issue for the Board's consideration on remand to the scope
of the variances to be granted. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 51 L. 4-24.) Because this is a violation
of Idaho Code § 67-5279, as interpreted in Daley, the District Court erred in so limiting
the scope of the issues to be considered by the board on remand. Therefore, this Court
should vacate this aspect of the District Court's decision.
E.

The District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Judd on the basis that
the decision of the Board was without a basis in fact or law.
If this Court vacates the decision of the District Court on any of the grounds set

forth above, it would also be appropriate for this Court to vacate the District Court's
award of costs and attorney fees to Judd, as Judd would no longer be considered the
prevailing party. Crown Point, 144 Idaho at 78, 156 P.3d at 579. In addition, this Court
should vacate the District Court's award of attorney fees to Judd because the decision
of the Board had a reasonable basis in fact or law, thereby precluding an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117. For these same reasons, this Court should
not award attorney fees on appeal to Judd.
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Idaho Code § 12-117 governs the awarding of attorney fees in civil actions to
which a public entity is a party. It reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a
county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
(2) If the prevailing party is awarded a partial judgment and the court finds
the party against whom partial judgment is rendered acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law, the court shall allow the prevailing party's
attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses in an amount which reflects
the person's partial recovery.
Idaho Code § 12-117(1 )-(2).

This Court exercises free review of a district court's

decision to award attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117. Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 361,
2 P.3d at 746.
An award of attorney fees under this statute is inappropriate in any action in
which the court is asked to interpret a statute for the first time within the context of the
facts of that case. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Boundary County, 138 Idaho 534, 537, 66
P.3d 238, 241 (2003). An error by a state agency or local governing body in applying a
legal standard to the evidence in the record does not automatically provide a basis for
an award of attorney fees. Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 361, 2 P.3d at 746; Cox v. State of
Idaho ex rel. Dep't of/ns., 121 Idaho 143,148,823 P.2d 177, 182 (Ct. App. 1991). If a

provision of a statute or ordinance is ambiguous or unclear, or if the proper
interpretation of such provision is not a matter of settled law, an award of attorney fees
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under Idaho Code § 12-117 is inappropriate, even if a court later finds the decision of
the agency or governing body to be erroneous.

Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah

County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081, 2007 WL 4125461 at *2-*3 (2007); Cox, 121

Idaho at 148, 823 P.2d at 182.
Each of the above principles apply here. This case calls for the application of
both a statute and a county ordinance which concurrently govern the consideration of
variance requests.

The issue on which the District Court based its decision was

whether a board of county commissioners could deny a variance request for failure to
prove that the granting of the requested variances would not conflict with the public
interest, when the structures which were the subject of the request were built without
the owner first having received the necessary permits - which, in this case, included
both a variance and a building permit.
The Board believed this was a valid basis for the denial of a variance, but the
District Court ultimately disagreed. The language of the statute and county ordinance
considered by the District Court in making its decision undeniably gives governing
boards wide, though not unbounded, discretion to grant or deny variances to certain
land use requirements.

In addition, there are no Idaho appellate decisions which

specifically address this issue.

Accordingly, the legal standards which the Board

applied in making its decision did not, on their face, give the degree of clear legal
direction which the appellate courts of this state have indicated would justify an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117. See University of Utah Hosp. v. Ada County,
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143 Idaho 808, 812, 153 P.3d 1154, 1158 (2007); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho
349, 355-56, 109 P.3d 1091, 1097-98 (2005).
Therefore, even though the District Court decided that the Board's decision was
based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, an award of attorney fees under
Idaho Code § 12-117, whether by the District Court or by this Court, would be
inappropriate because the Board's decision had a reasonable basis in fact and existing
statutes, case law, and county ordinances, and because this action involved the
interpretation of very broad statute and county ordinance language in a context which
has not been definitively addressed by Idaho's appellate courts.
V. CONCLUSION

The District Court erred in ordering that the record be augmented to include
information pertaining to a variance request which was not at issue in, nor relevant to,
the petition for judicial review before it.

The Court also erroneously held that the

decision of the Board was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.

In so

holding, ii impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the Board, particularly by
limiting the scope of remand to a determination of the extent of the variances which the
Court required the Board to grant. Finally, the District Court erred in awarding attorney
fees to Judd, and this Court should also decline to award attorney fees on appeal,
because the decision of the Board had a legitimate basis in fact and law and because
this is a case of first impression in this state. Therefore, this Court should vacate the
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decision of the District Court in Case No. CV-06-5323, and should affirm the decision of
the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in Case No. V-842-05.
Dated this

/J..r!,

day of March, 2008.
Kootenai County Department
of Administrative Services

Patrick M. Braden
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to I.AR. 34, I hereby certify that on this J/,tl, day of March, 2008, I
caused an original and six (6) bound copies and one (1) unbound, unstapled copy of
this brief to be sent via first class mail, postage prepaid, lo be filed with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, and further certify that I caused to be served two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing via first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the
following:
Scott L. Poorman
BECK & POORMAN, LLC
P. 0. Box 1390
8884 North Government Way, Suite D
Hayden, ID 83835-2871
Pursuant to I.AR. 34.1, I further certify that I have sent a signed, electronic copy
of this brief in searchable PDF format to the following e-mail addresses:
Clerk of the Supreme Court

sctbriefs@idcourts.net

Scott L. Poorman

scott@beck-poorman.com

Pafrick M. Braden

24

